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Chile has an unemployment insurance system with a unique funding mechanism and design. It combines 
individual savings accounts, funded by workers and companies, with a re-distributional fund financed by 
companies and the State. This paper investigates the factors associated to the unemployment risk and the 
impact of the introduction of the unemployment insurance. We use three measures of unemployment risk: 
involuntary unemployment, duration of unemployment and job reintegration. To do this, we use a monthly 
panel data of individuals from January 2002 to December 2004 for which we observe their labor status, firm 
characteristics, affiliation condition to the unemployment insurance and measures of economic cycle. Using 
the panel data and the labor history we estimate the impact of having the insurance or being an insurance 
beneficiary on the probability of unemployment and duration of unemployment, controlling for other factors. 
We use multinomial logit, semiparametric and parametric duration models, fixed effect conditional maximum 
likelihood  and  a  normal  fixed  effect  OLS.  In  contrast  to  what  the  international  literature  has  reported 
regarding the effects of traditional insurance programs in developed countries, we found that the introduction 
of  the  insurance  program  in  Chile  has  decrease  the  probability  of  unemployment  and  the  duration  of 
unemployment. 
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1  Introduction 
 
An unemployment insurance system with a unique funding mechanism and design was 
established in Chile in the year 2002. It combines individual savings accounts, funded by 
workers and companies, with a redistributional fund financed by companies and the State. 
Every month workers and companies deposit a percentage of salaries into individual 
                                                 
1 We are grateful for the comments provided by Carmen Pages, Alejandro Micco, Marcela Perticara, Eduardo 
Fajnzylber and Luis Eduardo Escobar in earlier versions of this paper. We are also indebted to Sara Correa for 
her invaluable contribution in managing the SPS database.    2 
accounts and, in parallel, companies and the State make deposits to a redistributional fund 
called the Unemployment Solidarity Fund
2 for each worker
3. The funds accumulated in the 
individual accounts and the redistributional funds are administered by a private institution 
which wins the fund administration rights for a period of 10 years through a public tender. 
Furthermore, the creation of the unemployment insurance encourages job-seeking through 
municipal job-search offices, which are responsible for listing vacancies and keeping a 
record of the unemployed. This original design for unemployment insurance substantially 
reduces the problems of moral risk encountered in traditional unemployment insurance, and 
offers protection from the risks associated to unemployment as well. 
 
The main objective of this part of the research is to determine the risk factors associated to 
unemployment and the possible impact of unemployment insurance. Three risk measures 
associated to unemployment will be used: involuntary loss of employment, duration of 
unemployment and return to work. This study is also part of a broader study targeted at 
analyzing to what extent and at what cost that risk is covered with the instruments 
available, and in what areas the unemployment protection instruments would need to be 
modified in order to better cover that risk. 
 
The traditional unemployment insurance systems, characteristic of industrialized countries, 
are based on the existence of a common redistributional fund financed by the current 
employers and workers, and at times by the State, which distributes the benefits to the 
unemployed. In general, studies have shown that this form of insurance tends to produce an 
overuse of the system due to problems of moral risk
4. In other words, companies fire 
workers more often, and the unemployed are willing to turn down job offers more 
frequently. Those studies indicate that these systems lengthen the duration of 
unemployment and the unemployment rate in the long run. All this leads to the creation of 
strong, expensive control mechanisms. Consequently, these kinds of systems are out of 
reach for lower income countries. 
 
Recent studies suggest that while unemployment insurance based on redistributional funds 
produces negative effects by increasing the duration of unemployment, it also produces 
indirect positive effects on the duration of subsequent employment
5. The benefits received 
during the periods of unemployment allow the worker to find a job that is more suitable for 
them and therefore have a better job-match. This positive effect is higher in countries with 
more generous unemployment insurance levels. Therefore, these systems provide for a 
better matching between the worker and employer and make the duration in employment 
longer. 
 
The Chilean unemployment insurance system also faces the problems of moral risk outlined 
above, since each worker owns the funds in their account needed to finance their 
                                                 
2 Fondo de Cesantía Solidario. 
3 Descripción y Evolución del Seguro de Cesantía en Chile, SAFP, Government of Chile. 
4 See Blanchard (2004) who discusses the problems of reforming unemployment insurance mainly in Europe. 
Atkinson and Micklewright (1991), Devine and Kiefer (1991) who review both the empirical and theoretical 
literature on the effects of unemployment insurance. Katz and Meyer (1990), Card and Levine (2000), Lalive 
and Zweimüller (2004), research the effects on the duration of unemployment. 
5 See, for example, Tatsiramos (2006).   3 
unemployment periods
6. Workers finance their unemployment periods through own 
resources and therefore have incentives to accept job offers and to find work promptly. 
However, unemployment insurance that is solely financed through individual accounts does 
not provide enough income for periods of unemployment if the time spent working was 
insufficient for workers to accumulate enough income for the unemployment periods, even 
for short periods. 
 
As such, the Chilean unemployment insurance system includes the creation of a 
redistributional fund, which is financed by companies and the State. This fund has 
redistributional qualities in that it helps to group risks, distributing resources from 
employers and workers with greater stability to the unemployed and low income workers. 
To avoid problems of moral risk, it includes a range of special characteristics. First, 
workers can only use it once they have used up the funds in their individual accounts. 
Second, the benefits are low and can only be received for a maximum of 5 months. Third, 
private management of the redistributional fund encourages the fulfilment of the eligibility 
requirements by the unemployed, since any improper use is deducted from the common 
fund. Fourth, a mechanism was implemented in which severance payments are deducted 
from the individual insurance account, which would reduce the incentives to falsifying the 
reasons for termination of contract. 
 
Even though the design of the Chilean unemployment insurance system is innovative and 
cautious by considering the problems of incentives, it still has not been evaluated. One of 
the main problems in evaluating it is that its design did not include the gradual 
incorporation of workers, less random, which does not allow the causal effect to be 
identified.  The implementation considered that all those who signed a contract after 
October 2002 are signed up to the insurance and must make the corresponding 
contributions. Therefore, all workers in the informal labor market are excluded, as well as 
some groups that are not signed up to the insurance such as public sector workers and the 
armed forces. In other words, the condition of having the insurance is not randomly 
allocated and various non-observable characteristics correlated to this condition introduce 
bias. The option of voluntarily signing up to the insurance scheme also exists, but in 
practice only 2% of unemployment insurance system members are voluntary. 
 
The Chilean labour market allows for the coexistence of two kinds of contract: open-ended 
contracts (which apply to 77% of contracted workers, CASEN 2006), and fixed-term or 
temporary contracts. Nonetheless, to date, 56% of unemployment insurance system 
members have temporary contracts. However, the insurance scheme design only considered 
that workers with permanent contracts would have access to the redistributional fund; the 
remaining workers only have access to the benefits in their individual capitalization 
accounts. Therefore, one would not expect problems of moral risk for workers with 
temporary contracts. 
 
As already indicated, the objective of this part of the research is to determine the risk 
factors associated to unemployment and the possible impact of unemployment insurance. 
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The risk factors associated to unemployment depend on the worker’s characteristics, the job 
characteristics, the labour market institutions and the economic cycle. The objective then is 
to try to isolate the effect of the unemployment insurance from the other explanatory 
variables using various econometric methodologies. 
 
This study used the employment history longitudinal data of the 2004 Social Protection 
Survey. A panel of individuals is constructed and their employment condition and company 
characteristics are observed monthly from January 2002 to December 2004, as well as their 
insurance usage condition and measures of the economic cycle. Using the employment 
history panel data, the possible impact of having the insurance or being an insurance 
beneficiary is estimated on the probability of being unemployed and on the duration of 
unemployment, controlling for factors correlated to the condition of unemployment 
insurance usage. Multinomial logit models, duration models and conditional maximum 
likelihood methods with fixed effects will be used. Additionally, a fixed effects panel is 
estimated to evaluate the effects on salaries. 
 
The multinomial logit model estimates how the introduction of unemployment insurance 
and the other explanatory variables affect the risk of unemployment measured by: 1) the 
probability of being unemployed conditional on being working in the previous period and 
2) the probability of finding a job conditional on being unemployed in the previous period. 
Those cases are identified from period to period and then a multinomial logit regression is 
carried out estimating the factors associated to the probability of being working, 
unemployed and inactive. This probability will be a function of the individual 
characteristics, and the characteristics of the job and the economy in the previous month. 
 
The duration analysis will allow us to evaluate if the introduction of unemployment 
insurance has increased the duration, correcting for other factors. 
 
The fixed effects conditional logit model allows us to estimate whether being an 
unemployment insurance system member or beneficiary has any effect on the probability of 
being unemployed. This model corrects for all non-observable individual characteristics 
that remain fixed in the period. 
 
Finally, the fixed effects panel allows us to evaluate if the introduction of unemployment 
insurance has increased salaries. This may be the result of better matching, by giving the 
unemployed more time to find the job for which they are best qualified. 
 
This report is structured as follows. After this introduction, Section 2 provides a brief 
overview and evaluation of the performance of the unemployment insurance system made 
by the authorities. Section 3 outlines the empirical model. Section 4 presents the data used 
and descriptive statistics. Section 5 presents the results. Finally, the conclusions are 
presented in Section 6. 
 
 
2  The Chilean labour market and unemployment insurance in Chile 
   5 
The data indicate that in the Chilean labour market 69% of workers are salaried, in other 
words more than 4.5 million people, 23% are independent workers and 9% employers, non-
remunerated relatives and domestic help workers (INE, 2007). 75% of salaried workers 
have an employment contract, in other words 3 million people; 25% do not have any 
contract (CASEN, 2006). These contracts are of two kinds: permanent or open-ended and 
temporary or fixed-term. 
 
The unemployment insurance system in Chile began in the year 2002 (Law 19.728). It has a 
financing structure that combines individual accounts with worker and company 
contributions, and financing from the State through an Unemployment Solidarity fund with 
contributions from companies and the State
7. 
 
Joining the unemployment insurance system was made compulsory for all new contracts 
signed after 2 October 2002. It is voluntary for workers that already had contracts signed 
before that date. Currently, voluntary members cover 2.2% of all unemployment insurance 
system membership. 
 
The financing mechanism depends on the type of contract. In the case of permanent 
contracts, the worker and company contribute 0.6% and 1.6% of taxable income 
respectively to an individual account (with a taxable income upper limit of 90 UF for the 
company). In addition, the employer must contribute 0.8% of taxable income to the 
Unemployment Solidarity Fund. 
  
The State also contributes to the Unemployment Solidarity Fund. The State contribution is 
defined according to the system coverage level (measured as the percentage of contributors 
of all private salaried workers aged over 18). Once fully operational (year 2009), the State 
contribution will total 225,792 UTM (equal to 7,389 million pesos or over US$14 million). 
 
Meanwhile, if the contract is temporary the contribution is 3% of taxable income and is 
only provided by the employer (with an upper limit of 90 UF) and goes entirely to the 
individual account. These workers do not have access to the redistributional fund. 
 
Eligibility depends on the fulfilment of certain minimum requirements, which are different 
for workers with open-ended and fixed-term contracts. Workers with open-ended contracts 
can opt for benefits financed through their individual account if they have 12 accredited 
continuous or discontinuous monthly contributions, independent of the cause of 
employment contract termination. The unemployment insurance funds 1 month per year 
worked, up to a maximum of 5 months. 
 
Workers with temporary contracts are eligible for the benefits if they have made at least six 
contributions. The unemployment insurance consists of the withdrawal of all the funds 
accumulated in the individual account, once off, and independent of the cause of the 
termination of the employment contract. 
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Eligibility for the Unemployment Solidarity Fund is restricted to workers with open-ended 
contracts. They must have made at least 12 contributions, and lost their job involuntarily, 
and not have accumulated enough funds in their individual accounts to finance the benefit. 
 
The unemployment insurance benefits are also complemented with job search and training 
support through the National Employment Office
8 and include financing for training and 
return to work programs, administered by the Municipal Employment Information Offices. 
 
According to the SAFP data, the number of employment insurance system members in June 
2007 totalled 5 million workers. The number of contributors was over 2.5 million in May 
2007; this suggests a system coverage of 70% (coverage = % of contributors out of total 
private salaried workers aged over 18 years). 
  
Workers with permanent contracts represented 56% of total contributors in May 2007. 
Most of these were young people aged between 25 and 30, and 33% were women. The 
most representative work is in the construction, retail, finance, real estate, business, leasing, 
and agriculture sectors. These represent nearly 60% of all contributors. 60% of contributors 
have monthly salaries between Ch$100,000 and Ch$300,000
9. 
 
Approximately 2.5 million unemployment insurance benefits have been paid out. Only 
60,000 of these have been paid using the Solidarity Fund. Most of the benefits have been 
paid to workers with temporary contracts. Regarding amounts, the benefits are higher for 
workers with open-ended contracts ($175,000 on average approx.). Meanwhile, workers 
with fixed contracts average benefits of $100,000 approx. The benefits paid using the 
Solidarity Fund are much higher, averaging $350,000 approx. 
 
 
3  Empirical Model  
 
As indicated earlier, the main objective of this section is to determine the risk factors 
associated to unemployment and the possible impact of the unemployment insurance 
scheme. 
 
This objective can be summarized as follows: 
 
( ) it it i t i t it riesgo X G T G T a b g d p e = + + + + ´ +  
 
Where riskit is the risk of unemployment measure that we will use for individual i in year t. 
This risk will be measured in various forms: 1) the probability of being unemployed, 2) the 
probability of being unemployed, working or inactive conditional on the individual having 
been working in t-1, 3) probability of being unemployed, working or inactive conditional 
on having been unemployed in t-1, and 4) the duration of unemployment. 
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Gi is a binary variable equal to 1 if the individual is signed up to or a beneficiary of the 
unemployment insurance scheme, Tt is a binary variable equal to 1 if the period is October 
2002 onwards. Therefore, if the condition of insurance usage/beneficiary had been random, 
the parameter associated to (Gi x Tt) would be the causal effect of unemployment insurance 
on the risk of unemployment. 
 
Finally, Xit is a vector of several variables that also determine the risk of unemployment. 
Personal characteristics of the worker, job characteristics and characteristics related to the 
economic cycle. 
 
The following econometric models will be used to evaluate the risk of unemployment: a 
multinomial logit model, parametric and semiparametric duration models, a fixed effects 
conditional maximum likelihood model and a traditional fixed effects panel.  
 
A brief description of these models is presented here. 
 
 
6.1.Multinomial logit model 
 
In the case of the multinomial logit model, the equation is as follows: 
 
( ) it it i t i t it riesgo X G T G T a b g d p e = + + + + ´ +  
 
In this case, risk is measured through two variables: job loss and return to work. 
 
To capture the factors affecting the risk of job loss, those who are working are identified 
monthly and the probability of being unemployed, working or inactive in the following 
period is estimated. To capture the factors affecting the risk of returning to work, the 
unemployed are identified monthly and the probability of being unemployed, working or 
inactive in the following period is estimated. 
 
In this case, variables Gi and Tt are included as described earlier. Xit includes education, 
age, gender, marital status, years of education, age, number of children, company size, a 
dummy for secondary industry and one for tertiary industry (leaving primary industry as a 
comparison group), length of time in job, unemployment rate month-region and dummies 
for month. 
 
A two equation system with binary dependent variable is estimated, where: 
 
1 si   esta empleado en el periodo  , condicional en   empleado en  1
2 si   esta desempleado en el periodo  , condicional en   empleado en  1
3 si   esta inactivo en el periodo  , condicional e
it Y i t i t




= n   empleado en  1 i t -
 
 
And a two-equation system with binary dependent variable, where: 
   8 
1 si   esta empleado en el periodo  , condicional en   desempleado en  1
2 si   esta desempleado en el periodo  , condicional en   desempleado en  1
it Y i t i t





Estimates are made distinguishing by type of contract. 
 
6.2.Unemployment Duration model 
 
In the case of duration analysis, the equation is as follows: 
 
( ) it it i t i t it riesgo X G T G T a b g d p e = + + + + ´ +  
 
In this case, risk is measured by the duration of involuntary unemployment. The state of 
involuntary unemployment is considered finished when the person finds a job. In this case, 
variables Gi and Tt are included as described earlier. Xit includes education, age, gender, 
marital status, years of education, age, number of children, company size, dummies for 
industry, and dummies for month for agriculture among others, if training was received. 
 
In order to study the characteristics and determinants of the time that a person is out of 
work, the well-known empirical strategy of duration analysis will be used. In this approach, 
the time that the person remains in a given state (in this case, time unemployed) is modelled 
as a random variable T￿0, which is distributed in some way among the population; with t as 
a particular value of T. 
 
The following functions that are important in the subsequent analysis are detailed below: 
￿  F(t)=P(T￿t), with t￿0, is the accumulated distribution function. 
￿  S(t)=1-F(t)=P(T>t), is called the survival function and expreses the probability of 
continuing or remaining in a state (survive) past a certain time. 
￿  ￿(t), is termed hazard ratio, and is simply the instantaneous probability (risk) that an 
individual leaves their state in time “t”. 
￿  H(t) is the function of accumulated risk (integral of ￿(t)) and is interpreted as the 
number of times that an individual moves from one state to another (fails), over a 
given time “t”. 
 
The duration analysis, or the duration models, are concentrated in the S(t), ￿(t), and H(t) 
estimates. Several approaches can be used for this, with their respective approaches and 




10 provide for a simple characterization of the duration of the 
variable or phenomenon being studied. This is because they calculate the three functions 
described earlier without imposing a given structure on the duration distribution, as well as 
not requiring more data than the durations themselves. As such, they are of great use when 
we do not have other explanatory variables or when they are qualitative. However in the 
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latter case, this type of model does not need any assumption on how the explanatory 
variables affect or shift the durations. 
 
Nevertheless, despite the usefulness of non-parametric models, they are not the best choice 
when we have explanatory variables (especially if they are continuous) and when we 
require a more complete or multivariate analysis as is often the case. A more flexible and in 
many ways more attractive choice is the Cox model
11. With this approach, distributive 
assumptions are not necessary. The key to exploiting this flexibility is to consider that 
events occur at given times, which may be ordered. Therefore, the analysis may be carried 
out solely using the order of the durations. In practical terms, this is equivalent to 
estimating and combining a discrete dependent variable models (for each period). In this 
case, time does not play a greater role than that of ordering observations. 
However, whatever the choice, these strategies face two aspects that make the analysis of 
the duration models somewhat unconventional: censorship and the not-normal distribution 
of the T distribution. These aspects make it unwise to use OLS type models (and their 
derivatives) or face censorship in the usual form (tobit or heckman), since the distributions 
of a variable associated to time can be quite different from normal; it is typically 
asymmetrical, and may well be bimodal, and the linear regression models are not robust to 
these deviations in the underlying assumptions. 
 
 
6.3.Conditional maximum likelihood model with fixed effects 
 
In the case of the conditional fixed effects model, the equation is as follows: 
 
( ) it i t it i t it riesgo f W G T a b p e = + + + ´ +  
 
Where riskit is the probability of unemployment of individual i in year t, ￿i is an individual 
fixed effect that includes all the characteristics of the worker that remain constant over 
time; as such it includes their condition of being an unemployment insurance system 
member/beneficiary. ft is a fixed effect over time, and therefore corrects for all the shocks 
that affect each individual i in the same way at each moment in time, as such it includes the 
binary variable from  2002 onwards. 
 
Since it is a panel model with dependent binary variable, it is estimated through maximum 
likelihood
12. 
The problem is to estimate how the set of explanatory variables affects the probability of 
being unemployed after controlling for the non-observable heterogeneity captured by ￿i. 
We are particularly interested in evaluating how being signed up to unemployment 
insurance affects the probability of being unemployed after implementation. 
 
In this estimate, Xit includes number of children, company size, a dummy for secondary 
industry and one for tertiary industry (leaving primary industry as a comparison group), 
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length of time in job, unemployment rate month-region, dummies for month, and dummies 
for year. Given the available data, several other individual characteristics are assumed to be 
fixed such as gender, education and marital status. However, education and marital status 
are not necessarily fixed effects, and not considering them may bias the estimates 
significantly, since the structure of the model excludes individuals whose status in the 
labour market (employed, unemployed) remains constant during the whole period. If this 
condition is correlated with the probability of being employed or unemployed, the estimates 
will be biased. 
 
Since the dependent variable is discrete, we cannot use the usual techniques for panel data 
estimates. As such, the conditional likelihood model
13 which has been implemented in 
STATA as the conditional fixed effects logistical estimate
14. 
 
A panel for months is constructed using the employment history of the Social Protection 
Survey, and the model is estimated with panel data. 
 
The control variables include a binary variable, which indicates whether the person is 
signed up or not to the unemployment insurance. It also includes other factors related to 
individual characteristics that change over time, since the fixed characteristics will be 
corrected with the individual fixed effect. Examples are the number of children born 
between 2002 and 2004, and the average duration in the job. Variables related to company 
such as the type of economic activity and company size are added. Finally, indicators per 
month are included to capture cyclical factors and the unemployment rate of the region. 
 
 
6.4.Fixed effects panel 
 
A final specification summarizes the effects on salaries: 
 
( ) log it it i t i t it w X G T G T a b g d p e = + + + + ´ +  
 
which results in the following after estimating with fixed effects: 
 
( ) log it i t it i t it w f W G T a b p e = + + + ´ +  
 
Where logw is the income logarithm, and Xit includes number of children, company size, a 
dummy for secondary industry and one for tertiary industry (leaving primary industry as a 
comparison group), length of time in job, unemployment rate month-region, dummies for 
month, dummies for year. Like in the conditional fixed effects model, ￿i is an individual 
fixed effect that includes all the worker’s characteristics that remain fixed over time. As 
such, it includes their condition of being signed up to the unemployment 
insurance/insurance beneficiary. ft is a fixed effect over time, and therefore corrects for all 
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14 For further details see Methodological Appendix.   11 
the shocks that affect each i equally at each moment in time. Consequently, it includes the 
binary variable from October 2002 onwards. 
 
 
4  Data 
 
The present study is based on the Social Protection Survey (SPS).  The SPS is a 
longitudinal survey of approximately 20,000 people.  The first round of the SPS was 
implemented in the year 2002 and the second round at the end of 2004 and the beginning of 
2005.  
 
The 2002 SPS was designed as a representative sample of the population aged 15 and over, 
covered by the pension system.  The main innovation of the 2004 SPS was to include the 
population without pension system coverage.  A small modification was to adjust the new 
sample to individuals that were aged at least 18 years of age at December 2003. 
Additionally, the coverage for new pension system members was extended by 
approximately 1,000 people.  In effect, the 2004 SPS covered the sample interviewed in 
2002, as well as non-pension system members and finally the new system members, all 
totalling 21,000 people. 
 
The main modules applied in the 2002-2004 SPS and used as inputs in this study are 
Employment History, General Information, Health, Training, Personal History and other 
modules. 
 
The Employment History module includes detailed information on all employment 
activities reported by respondents since January 2002 (2004 SPS), characterizing jobs in 
detail, periods of inactivity and unemployment.  In the case of individuals who were not 
interviewed in the year 2002 (either because they are new unemployment insurance system 
members or system non-members), employee histories cover the period from January 1980 
to date, and thereby cover the same period of self-reporting as the system members in the 
2002 SPS. 
 
Each row includes individual employee histories, which report the starting and ending 
period of the employment activity as well as its characteristics. For example, in the periods 
when working, a series of questions are asked on the job characteristics (activity, 
profession, type of job – be it temporary or permanent-, with a contract, etc.). Meanwhile, 
in the periods of unemployment, questions are asked on whether the individual received 
unemployment insurance or subsidies, and inactive individual are asked about the reason 
for their inactivity. 
 
The General Information module captures the main socioeconomic characteristics, such as 
relationship to the head of household, gender, age, state of health and education. 
The Training module reports the main training activities of the respondent over time, the 
methods of financing used and the employment dividends received.  
   12 
The Personal History module characterizes marriages and co-habitation reported by 
respondents, as well as a range of information on the children. The latter variables are 
crucial for our analysis. 
 
This study required bringing together the databases from 2002 and 2004 with the 
information from the modules described early.  Regarding the sample, this database is 
comprised of the system-members interviewed in 2002 and 2004 and also of the sample 
included in 2004 (system non-members and new members), totalling 16,727 people. Notice 
that when considering the employee histories of each one, the total observations increase 
since they may have more than one employment history. 
 
The unified database has been used to estimate the duration models. To estimate the panel 
models with discrete dependent variables, the 2002-2004 database was transformed to make 
it into a balanced panel, in other words, a panel which reflects all the individual employee 
histories monthly. 
 
The averages of the main variables used in the estimates are reported here below, 




In Table 2, the first three rows report the variables that will then be used to identify the 
effect of UI
16 on the various employment phenomena of interest. 
 
The payment amounts received are around 50,000 pesos per month (100 dollars), with 
around 5% of the sample receiving it (by the end of the period being studied, 2004). 
Meanwhile, system members approached 30%. 
 
The duration of unemployment and employment is reported below. In the case of 
unemployment, it is 4 months (median) and in the case of the latter it approaches 20 months 
for those working, and 7 months for the unemployed (duration of last job). The percentage 
of unskilled population exceeds 80%; most inactive people are women and the young; 7% 
worked part-time; 6% left their last job for reasons attributable to the worker; 60% of 
contracts were permanent; 27% reported having received benefits; 12% of women had 
children between 2002 and 2004; 30% indicate they have bad health; 2% worked in 
emergency employment plans (PEM). 
 
 
5  Descriptive statistics of the risks of unemployment 
 
Tables  E1  to  E6  present  the  percentage  of  workers  that  shift  from  employment  to 
unemployment.  The  workers  are  classified  according  to  various  characteristics  such  as 
gender, educational level, type of job, and reasons for leaving job. 
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For example, Table E1 shows that the highest percentage of unemployed workers is found 
in December 2002 and December 2003. This shows a relatively increasing trend over time. 
Meanwhile, Table E2 shows the proportion of unemployed workers and classifies them by 
reasons  for  leaving  their  job,  mainly  separating  by  involuntary  dismissal  and  reasons 
attributable to the worker. In general, involuntary dismissal is found to predominate. 
 
Tables E3 and E4 show the shift of the worker from employed to unemployed according to 
gender and educational level characteristics. There are no significant differences between 
men and women except in December 2003 when 7.23% of women were unemployed and 
only 3.41% of men were in the same situation. There are no significant differences in terms 
of educational level. 
 
Tables  E7  to  E9  capture  the  percentage  of  workers  that  move  from  unemployment  to 
employment. In contrast to the earlier tables, they focus on returning to work.  
 
Tables E10 to E14 focus on the average salaries of those who shifted from employment to 
unemployment highlighting the main characteristics such as gender, educational level, type 
of job and reasons for leaving the job.  
 
Tables E15 to E23 show the duration of unemployment, highlighting the main differences 
in gender, educational level, type of job, among others. For example, Table E15 shows that 
women  have  longer  periods  of  unemployment.  Surprisingly,  there  are  no  significant 
differences as a result of educational level (see Table E16). 
 
Table E17 shows the duration of unemployment by different economic sectors. It reveals 
that the duration of unemployment was higher for workers in the financial and transport 
sectors. 
 
Meanwhile, workers whose last job was permanent have shorter periods of unemployment 
(Table E19), while those whose last job was with fixed-term contracts have shorter periods 
(Table E20). 
 
Table E21 focuses on the reasons for leaving the job, and reveals that workers who lost 
their  job  for  reasons  attributable  to  themselves  face  longer  periods  of  unemployment. 
Workers who had children in January 2002 and December 2004 also show longer periods 
of unemployment (Table E22). 
 
Finally,  Table  E23  compares  salaries  to  unemployment  insurance.  It  shows  that  even 
though the unemployment insurance amount is higher for workers with higher salaries, the 
growth rate is very low. For example, while workers that earn around Ch$70,000 receive 
Ch$35,000 on average, those who earn Ch$600,000 receive little more than Ch$50,000.  
 
Therefore, the substitution rate for those with lower salaries is relatively generous at around 
50% (for workers earning less than Ch$100,000). Meanwhile, for workers who earn more 
than Ch$350,000 (the highest bracket) the rate is 10%. In other words, the system may be   14 
deemed  progressive,  since  while  lower  salaried  workers  receive  a  relatively  optimum 
coverage




6  Econometric Results  
 
The results of the estimates of the models described in Section 3 are reported here below. 
The tables and figures are found in Section 7. 
 
 
6.1.Conditional maximum likelihood model with fixed effects 
 
This section describes the results of the fixed effects or conditional logit logistical model. 
The sample used for these estimates corresponds to individuals who report employment and 
unemployment events between January 2002 and December 2004. All of this is based on 
the SPS. 
 
Differentiated estimates were carried out for each treatment indicator: ui1_sc (beneficiary 
of UI after the program) and ui1_anio (unemployment insurance system members (SC) 
after the program). 
 
Tables 3 and 4 report the coefficients corresponding to those estimates. Table 3 reports 
them for those with temporary contracts and Table 4 presents the results for those with 
permanent contracts. 4 columns are presented. The first two use unemployment insurance 
system members as the insurance impact indicator, in other words those with a fixed term 
contract after October 2002. On the other hand, the second two columns show the results 
using the system beneficiaries as the insurance impact indicator, in other words, those who 
indicated having received unemployment insurance benefits after October 2002. It also 
distinguishes whether the estimate used or did not use expansion factors
19. 
 
The model explains why an individual who is identified as unemployed (employed) in the 
estimate period conditional on being identified as working (unemployed) at least once. As 
we already stated, individuals whose condition does not change do not contribute to the 
estimate and are automatically discarded in the estimate process. 
 
                                                 
17 This applies for those who actually receive it, and it should be highlighted that many of those in this bracket 
are fixed-term workers, who as soon as they change contract (not necessarily employer) immediately claim 
the unemployment insurance, which could be detrimental in times of real crisis, since their individual 
accounts will be empty. In addition, for these types of workers, it is the employer who deposits the entire 
amount of the contribution, which, as we know, is in many cases, already internalized in the salary, and so 
could be considered a forced savings. 
18 In addition, these workers, who normally have permanent contracts, are potential recipients of the Solidarity 
Unemployment Insurance. However, as we know, they have very few incentives to claim it since the 
prevailing strategy is to take out all you can from your own individual account. 
19 The equation has not been convergent in the case of permanent contracts with expansion factors for 
beneficiaries. As such, the results have not been reported in this Preliminary Report.   15 
The coefficients presented are only gross coefficients. We can only interpret their sign, but 
the size of those coefficients does not mean much. 
 
All the variables presented further ahead in the MNL or the duration analysis and that were 
not considered in this estimate, were not considered due to a lack of information on changes 
over time. 
 
Table 3 shows that in the group of workers with temporary contracts in the period being 
studied, there is a positive (negative) and significant effect of unemployment insurance on 
the probability of being unemployed (employed). This is conditional on all the unobserved 
fixed individual characteristics (for example, gender). The number of children does not 
affect that condition, nor does company size. However, working in a secondary industry 
affects it negatively, compared to a primary industry. The longer the length of time in a job, 
the lower the probability of being unemployed. Monthly and annual dummies correct for 
cyclical effects in the economy. Finally, the higher the regional unemployment rate, the 
higher the probability of being unemployed. 
 
Table 4 shows that in the group of workers with permanent contracts in the period being 
studied, there is a positive (negative) and significant effect of unemployment insurance on 
the probability of being unemployed (employed) when we use the condition of 
unemployment insurance system member as an indicator, but it is not significant when we 
use the condition of beneficiary. Once again, it is conditional on all the unobserved 
individual fixed characteristics. Only some monthly dummies and the length of time in job 
are significant. Unemployment is more likely in the second semester of the year compared 
to January. Years 2003 and 2004 also show a higher impact on the probability of being 
unemployed. 
 
6.2.Multinomial logit model 
 
The first results of the MNL models are presented here below. Tables 5 and 6 present the 
results for the risk of job loss. Table 5 covers permanent contracts and Table 6 temporary 
contracts. Tables 7 and 8 present the results for the risk of returning to work. Table 7 covers 
permanent contracts and Table 8 temporary contracts. Only one logit model was estimated 
in this case with two possible results: working or unemployed, since the observations for 
those shifting from unemployed to inactive were insufficient for the multinomial estimates. 
 
The estimates take the condition of being employed as the base. As such, all parameters 
must be interpreted relative to the reference group. The standard interpretation is that for 
one unit of change in the explanatory variable, the logit of the unemployed/inactive 
condition relative to being employed is expected to change in the respective parameter, 
since the other variables remain constant. There are marginal effects. 
 
Therefore, Tables 5 and 6 show the results (with the model described in Section 3.2) of the 
factors that raise the probability of being unemployed and inactive relative to being 
employed, conditional on having been employed in the previous month. This applies for 
those with an open-ended contract and a fixed-term contract respectively. Table 5 shows, 
for example, that being a women reduces the probability of being inactive relative to being   16 
employed. The number of children reduces the probability of being unemployed relative to 
being employed. The longer the length of time in the job, the lower the probability of being 
unemployed or inactive relative to being employed. The first variable that measures the 
impact of unemployment insurance (unemployment insurance system member x Oct2002) 
shows a reduction effect on the probability of being unemployed or inactive relative to 
being employed. The second variable that measures the impact of unemployment insurance 
(beneficiary x Oct2002) does not show effects on being unemployed, but shows negative 
effects on the probability of being inactive. Table 6 shows the results for those with fixed-
term contracts. 
 
Tables 7 and 8 show the results (with the model described in Section 3.2) of the factors that 
increase the probability of being unemployed and inactive relative to being employed, 
conditional on having been unemployed in the previous month, for workers with temporary 
and fixed-term contracts respectively. Both tables show that being signed up to 
unemployment insurance reduces the probability of being unemployed relative to that of 
being employed. However, the effect of unemployment insurance measured by the 
beneficiary condition has no effects on the probability of being unemployed. 
 
 
6.3.Duration Model  
 
This section describes the results of the duration analysis. The sample used for these 
estimates corresponds to individuals whose periods of unemployment were shorter than 14 
months, starting in January 2002, and with more than one employment history (they were 
not unemployed for the whole period, which is a sign of inactivity). All of this is based on 
the SPS. 
 
Firstly, the results of the non-parametric analysis are described, and we then proceed with 
the semiparametric Cox analysis. In the latter case, socioeconomic variables are included 
(gender, age, head of household, children), as well as other more personal variables (health, 
disability, height, weight, schooling, social capital, etc.). Finally, a range of especially 
significant variables are those that capture several characteristics of the last job before 
ending up unemployed (duration, cause of termination, company characteristics, etc.). 
 
We estimate differentiated equations for each treatment indicator: ui_sc (UI beneficiary) 





The non-parametric results are presented below and are merely a first approach to the 
phenomenon being studied. It should obviously include various factors together that can 
affect the estimated probabilities. This is tackled in the semiparametric estimates. 
 
Figure 1 (Kaplan-Meier) indicates the probability of remaining unemployed, conditional on 
having completed “t” months in that condition. For example, those who are 5 months   17 
unemployed have a probability equal to 0.5 of continuing in that state (this would be 
interpreted as the median duration), at 8 months that probability is only 0.25. 
 
Figure 2 (Nelson-Aalen) indicates the accumulated probability over time of leaving the 
state of unemployment. It could be interpreted as an approximation (expected value) of the 
time it takes a person to leave the state of unemployment or, from another point of view, as 
the expected value of ‘failures’ that a person can have over time (assuming that the 
phenomenon being studied allows ‘failing’ more than once). In this case, the failure is 
defined as leaving unemployment. As such, the model predicts that after the sixth month of 
unemployment, the average person will most likely have left the state of unemployment. 
 
Figure 3 (Smoothed hazard) is probably the most significant, since it indicates how the 
hazard rate evolves or the instantaneous probability that individuals leave unemployment as 
a function of (and conditional on) the duration of unemployment. Thus, we observe that in 
this case the probability increases with duration, but only until 10 months of 
unemployment, after which it starts to decrease slowly. One possible interpretation is that 
individuals who remain over 10 months unemployed become potential candidatates for 
inactivity and/or discarged unemployment. However, these individuals have a higher 
probability of getting a job than those less than 6 months unemployed. The point being that 
after 10 months that probability decreases.  
 
Since the sample used corresponds to individuals less than 14 months unemployed, the 
curve only reaches that level. However, if the estimate used the whole sample, one would 
observe that the probability moves to zero at around 20 months.  
 
Several hazard rate estimates are presented here below separated by some of the variables 
of greatest interest in the semiparametric estimates indicated further ahead. Firstly, we have 
the variable “ui_sc” which indicates if the worker claimed unemployment insurance 
(ui_sc=1) or not (ui_sc=0) (see Figure 4). It shows that even though the probability of 
leaving unemployment is higher for those claiming UI, its decline starts several months 
before that of those who did not claim (around the sixth month compared to the tenth 
month). In fact, at around the eighth month of unemployment, those who did not claim UI 
start to have a higher probability of leaving that state. 
  
When we carry out the same analysis, distinguishing between UI system members and non-
members shown in Figure 5, we observe that members have an advantage of several points 
in terms of the possibility of leaving unemployment than their peers. Even the decrease 
point starts one month later. 
 
Figure 6 shows differences when we separate between those whose last job was reported as 
permanent versus temporary. It shows that the latter are more likely to leave unemployment 
from the fourth month. At first, this may seem to be noteworthy, but one possible 
explanation is the lower reserve salary of those with fixed-term or pay per-contract jobs. In 
addition, if we associate the relatively early decrease point of the ui_sc=1 curve with 
workers whose last job was permanent, maybe we could speculate about their higher level 
of difficulty for returning to the labor market, once they have spent too much time 
unemployed (specificity of human capital, age, etc).   18 
 
Figure 7 shows differences by gender. Men are found to have an advantage which begins to 
change from the ninth month. 
 
Semiparametric estimates (Cox Ratios) 
 
Table 9 indicates the semiparametric estimate (Cox ratios) of the first group of duration 
models. These estimates correspond to the same sample used to obtain the non-parametric 
results. The variance estimates were carried out based on strata by region and the “tied 
failures” were tackled with the Efron approximation. 
 
As Table 9 shows, the greatest difference in the specifications lies in the use of variables 
ui_sc versus the range of dummies that tries to capture the impact of the implementation of 
the policy: ui_anio=1 if the period is greater than or equal to October 2002 
(implementation); ui1=1 if signed up to unemployment insurance (irrespective of period); 
ui1_anio=1 if both are 1. In g1_m1_ec4, the only difference with regard to g1_m1_ec1 is 
the elimination of ‘frictional’ unemployment (1 or 2 months). On the other hand, in the last 
two specifications, models 1 and 2 were estimated again, but with a different variance 
specification, since intra-group correlation was assumed (frailty), with the groups being 
defined based on regions (in the context of the Cox model, this is equivalent to using 
random effects). 
 
In general terms, certain sensitivity is observed in the estimates, particularly in the duration 
in the last job (ult_trab_dur1), which is a parameter of high interest. The coefficient of ui1 
also becomes not-significant when accompanied by ui_anio. This is surely due to the high 
degree of colinearity found between these variables. The interpretation of the variables is 
that of ratios. For example, the coefficient of ui_sc in specification 1 indicates that those 
who claimed UI have 20% higher probability of leaving unemployment than those that did 
not claim it. Meanwhile, specification 2 shows that UI system members have 60% higher 
probability of leaving unemployment than their non-system member peers.  
 
In the following analysis, we will mainly focus on the specifications based on ui_sc, since it 




Table 10 presents a complete report of the parameters. The most significant difference 
between model 1 and 2 is that for the specification that uses ui1, the duration of the last job 
and whether benefits were received (ult_trab_i~m) are not-significant. The other variables 
show that those who did not receive training in the 2002-2004 period have 18 points lower 
probability of leaving unemployment than their trained peers; women have 22 points less 
than men, and those who had children in that period have nearly 30 points less; in terms of 
                                                 
20 Cox & Snell (1968), showed that if the Cox regression model adequately adjusts the data, then the real 
accumulated risk function conditional on the covariate vector has an exponential distribution with a hazard 
rate of 1. Thus, the accumulated risk function of the Cox-Snell residuals should be a 45° line. To verify how 
our model fit the data, we should first estimate our Nelson-Aalen accumulated risk function based on the Cox-
Snell residuals. Thus, the adjustment-fit will depend on how far our empirical estimate is from the 45° line.   19 
age groups, those aged 65 and over have lower employment possibilities; heads of 
household have 25 points more; those who do not need help to move around (disability) 
have nearly 35 points more; those who report bad health have 14 points less; men who 
measure less than 170cm have 12 points less; and those who have participated in 
emergency employment programs have 25 points less. 
 
Finally, a range of variables related to the characteristics of the last job are analyzed. This 
shows that workers from the agricultural sector seem to have higher probabilities between 
May and November, while those who worked in the mining, industrial, construction and 
community services sectors have higher probabilities of leaving unemployment than their 
counterparts in the retail sector. Those whose last job was part-time (less than 30 hours a 
week, ult_trab_m~t) have approximately 30 points less; those who were fired for reasons 
attributable to the worker (ult_trab_c~a) have 40 points less. Interestingly (and reinforcing 
the results of the non-parametric analysis) those whose last job was permanent have 22 
points less (which in some way reinforces the not-very-robust coefficient associated to the 
duration of the last job, ult_trab_d~1). Those who report having received severance 
payments in their last job have 16 points more. 
 
Finally, Figures 11, 12 and 13 are identical to those reported in the non-parametric analysis, 
but in this case they are derived from the semiparametric estimates. The conclusions hold, 
although the differences in impact on the duration of unemployment may be smaller and 
more homogenous over time. 
 
6.4.Fixed effects panel 
 
This section shows the results of the fixed effects panel for evaluating effects on salaries. 
Table 9 presents the results. 
 
The variable that measures the effect of unemployment insurance (measured by UI system 
members) has a positive and significant effect on salaries. This only applies for those who 
have a permanent job. The effect measured by beneficiaries is not statistically significant. 
 
 
7  Conclusions 
 
An unemployment insurance system with a unique funding mechanism and design was 
established in Chile in the year 2002. It combines individual savings accounts, funded by 
workers and companies with a redistributional fund financed by companies and the State. 
Every month workers and companies deposit a percentage of salaries into individual 
accounts, and in parallel companies and the State make deposits to a redistributional fund 
called the Unemployment Solidarity Fund for each worker
21. The funds accumulated in the 
individual accounts and the redistributional funds are administered by a private institution 
which wins the fund administration rights for a period of 10 years through a public tender. 
Furthermore, the creation of unemployment insurance encourages job-seeking through 
municipal job-search offices, which are responsible for listing vacancies and keeping a 
                                                 
21 Descripción y Evolución del Seguro de Cesantía en Chile, SAFP, Government of Chile.   20 
record of the unemployed. This original design for unemployment insurance allows for a 
substantial reduction of the problems of moral risk associated to traditional unemployment 
insurance, as well as offering protection from the risks associated to unemployment. 
 
As indicated earlier, the main objective of this part of the research is to determine the risk 
factors associated to unemployment and the possible impact of unemployment insurance. 
The factors behind the risks associated to unemployment depend on the characteristics of 
the worker, the job, the labour market institutions and the economic cycle. The objective is 
to try to isolate the effect of unemployment insurance from the other explanatory variables 
using various econometric methodologies. 
 
This study used the employment history longitudinal data of the 2004 Social Protection 
Survey. A panel of individuals is constructed and their employment condition and company 
characteristics are observed monthly from January 2002 to December 2004, as well as their 
UI usage condition and measures of the economic cycle. Using the employment history 
panel data, the possible impact on the probability of being unemployed and on the duration 
of unemployment of having UI or of being an insurance beneficiary is estimated, 
controlling for factors related to the condition of UI usage. Multinomial logit models, 
duration models and conditional maximum likelihood methods with fixed effects will be 
used. Additionally, a fixed effects panel is estimated to evaluate the effects on salaries. 
 
In contrast to the findings in the international literature on the effects of the traditional 
unemployment insurance systems, individuals who receive unemployment insurance 
benefits or those who are merely system members have a lower probability of being 
unemployed and have shorter unemployment periods than their peers. This may be 
interpreted as a positive trait of the current Chilean system, or as a reflection of the 
segmentation of the labor market, in which the beneficiaries are those who are most 
employable. Given that the amounts paid out are not very high, they do not constitute 
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In this paper, we will follow the traditional non-parametric methods
22. Since the remaining 
functions of interest -h(t) and H(t)- can be derived from the survival function-S(t), a brief 
description is provided on how the former is calculated.  
 
For a range of data (durations): t1, …, tk, where k is the number of different durations 
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where nj is the number of individuals at risk (remaining in one state) in time tj, and dj is the 
number of failures (leaving the state) at that time. 
 
 
Cox Semiparametric models 
 
More concretely, if the hazard rate for individual “j” is: 
 
( ) ( ) 0 \
j x x
j h t x h t e
b =  
 
where the betas are estimated from the data, the key aspect (and attractive aspect) of the 
Cox model is that the baseline hazard (which captures the time ‘effect’ in the risk rate) – 
h0(t)- does not get any particular parameterization and, in fact, is not estimated. In other 
words, the model does not make any assumption on the trajectory of the hazard rate over 
time (constant, decreasing, non-monotonic, etc.); the key aspect is that no matter the 
trajectory, it is the same for all individuals. From another perspective, the hazard rate of an 
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which is constant, assuming that xj and xm do not change over time. Thus, we see that it is 
not necessary to make any assumption regarding h0. 
 
                                                 
22 Kaplan & Meier (1958), Nelson (1972) and Aalen (1978). See Lancaster, as a modern reference of the 
duration models.   23 
 
Fixed effects Conditional Model 
 
Consider the following problem. We have i = 1 . . . N individuals; t = 1 . . .T periods in 
which the individual is observed; we observe the employment status for each individual in 
each period: 
 
1 si   esta desempleado en el periodo 
0 si   esta empleado en el periodo 






We also observe a set of explanatory variables of employment status Xit; we assume that 
the observed binary variables Yit are independent conditional on Xit and on an unobservable 
fixed-effect of each individual ￿i; the probability that individual i is employed in period t is 
assumed to be a logitic: 
 
















The proposed solution is to maximize the conditional version of the verisimilitude function. 
The intuition is that Fi disappears from the likelihood function if the probability of a 
sequence of unemployment for a particular individual is calculated conditional on the total 
number of unemployment periods of this individual. 
 
For example, in the case of T = 2, the likelihood function can be expressed as:  
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W01 = 1 for the individual whose sequence is {0,1}, in other words, who is employed in 
period 1 and unemployed in period 2; W10 = 1 for the individual whose sequence is {1,0}; 
W00 = 1 for the individual whose sequence is {0,0}; W11 = 1 for the individual whose 
sequence is {1,1}. 
 
For the sequences {0,0} and {1,1} the probability is 1, since: 
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Then: 
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The fixed effect is eliminated analogously to the panel in first differences. Individuals 
whose dependent variable status does not change do not contribute to the verisimilitude 
function. This may be a defect, since it implies that its status does not depend on the 
explanatory factors; in addition that information is not used and may represent a high 
percentage of the sample.   25 
Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Definition of variables 
Variables Description
ui_sc Dummy variable: 1 if indicates having used the unemployment 
insurance upon job termination
ui1 Dummy variable: 1 if signed up for unemployment insurance and 0 if 
not.  In line with the impact evaluation scheme, this variable reflects 
those who are "treated" and therefore, is 1 for UI members whatever 
the period.
c19_06 Unemployment insurance amount
ui_anio Dummy variable: 1 if greater than or equal to October 2002 and 0 if 




*      ó 
DUR_EMP
Measures the duration of the last job
capacita   Dummy variable: 1 if indicates not having received training and 0 if has 
received it
mujer Dummy variable: 1 if a woman and 0 if not
n_hijo04 Dummy variable: 1 if a woman who had children between 2002-2004, 
0 if not
edad_16_21 Dummy variable: 1 if the age of the inteviewee is less than or equal to 
21 and 0 otherwise. Note that the interviewee sample is aged 16 years 
or older
edad_22_31 Dummy variable: 1 if the age of the interviewee is greater than or equal 
to 22 years and less than or equal to 31 years,  0 if otherwise.
edad_32_41 Dummy variable: 1 if the age of the interviewee is greater than or equal 
to 32 years and less than or equal to 41 years,  0 if otherwise.
edad_42_51 Dummy variable: 1 if the age of the interviewee is greater than or equal 
to 42 years and less than or equal to 51 years,  0 if otherwise.
edad_52_64 Dummy variable: 1 if the age of the interviewee is greater than or equal 
to 52 years and less than or equal to 64 years,  0 if otherwise.
 jefe   Dummy variable: 1 if head of household and 0 if otherwise
ayuda Dummy variable: 1 if indicates needing help to carry out any kind of 
activity and 0 if not. The corresponding activities include, for example, 
bathing, climbing stairs, eating, getting dressed, etc.
salud   Dummy variable: 1 if indicates health to be regular, bad and very bad,  
0 if otherwise. 
hombre_bajo Dummy variable: 1 if a man and measures less than 170cm.,  0 if 
otherwise.     26 
 
Table 1. (Continuation): Description of variables 
Variables Description
pem Dummy variable: 1 if indicates having participated in emergency 
employment programs,  0 if otherwise.
agri Dummy variable: 1 if indicates that the economic sector of the last job
is agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing,  0 if otherwise.
minas Dummy variable: 1 if indicates that the economic sector of the last job
is mining and quarrying,  0 if otherwise.
indust Dummy variable: 1 if indicates that the economic sector of the last job
is manufacturing industries,  0 if otherwise.
comercio Dummy variable: 1 if indicates that the economic sector of the last job
is retail, restaurants and hotels,  0 if otherwise.
electric Dummy variable: 1 if indicates that the economic sector of the last job
is electricity, water and gas,  0 if otherwise.
construc Dummy variable: 1 if indicates that the economic sector of the last job
is construction,  0 if otherwise.
transport Dummy variable: 1 if indicates that the economic sector of the last job
is transport, storage and communication,  0 if otherwise.
serv_fin Dummy variable: 1 if indicates that the economic sector of the last job
is financial services, insurance, goods,  0 if otherwise.
serv_com Dummy variable: 1 if indicates that the economic sector of the last job
is community, socials and personal services,  0 if otherwise.
nobien_espe
c
Dummy variable: 1 if indicates that the economic sector of the last job





Dummy variable: 1 if last job was part-time, 0 if otherwise. Part-time is




Dummy variable: 1 if the reason for dismissal from the last job was









Dummy variable: 1 if received severance payment in the last job, 0 if
otherwise. 
 
* Los nombres que se encuentran señalados en mayúsculas constan en la base de los models Logit de fixed effects and multinomial 
and representan las mismas variables denotadas en minúscula pero con nombres different, es decir, estas variables son operativas 
en cualquiera de los estados.   27 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Working Unemployed Inactive
c19_06 51869,37 48309,37 33736
ui_sc 0,96% 4,63% 0,00%
ui1 32,20% 33,00% 21,69%
ult_trab_dur1
*        ó 
DUR_EMP
19,80465 6,931606 4,921823
capacita   84,20% 88,82% 90,74%
mujer 39,20% 48,67% 68,03%
n_hijo04 11,94% 8,20% 9,83%
edad_16_21 3,24% 2,43% 9,63%
edad_22_31 29,48% 30,36% 26,45%
edad_32_41 30,01% 28,25% 20,57%
edad_42_51 21,65% 22,65% 12,27%
edad_52_64 12,35% 13,67% 15,47%
 jefe   54,50% 45,72% 37,13%
ayuda 2,09% 1,82% 8,25%
salud   28,84% 35,76% 49,66%
hombre_bajo 34,62% 31,72% 18,50%
pem 2,10% 2,48% 0,91%
agri 14,36% 15,86% 0,00%
minas 1,52% 0,35% 0,00%
indust 13,73% 7,73% 0,00%
comercio 18,89% 8,75% 0,00%
electric 0,58% 0,16% 0,00%
construc 15,28% 8,32% 0,00%
transport 6,87% 2,73% 0,00%
serv_fin 6,01% 2,28% 0,00%























   28 
Table 3 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Not Weighted Weighted Not Weighted Weighted




Number of children 18.153 24.442 18.281 19.000
[23,007.706] [21,510.326] [27,285.373] [1,628.755]
Company size 25.711 35.242 36.526 36.700
[912.662] [947.728] [1,528.472] [65.846]
Secondary Industry -10.484 -15.506 -15.378 -15.403
[1,111.552] [676.910] [6,789.066] [305.562]
Tertiary Industry -6.223 -11.238 -11.763 -11.773
[1,111.552] [676.910] [6,789.066] [305.562]
Length of time in job -0.009 0.003 -0.095 -0.096
[0.026] [0.001]** [0.025]** [0.001]**
Month=2 0.190 0.175 0.278 0.257
[0.258] [0.011]** [0.256] [0.011]**
Month=3 0.097 0.088 0.248 0.228
[0.259] [0.011]** [0.257] [0.011]**
Month=4 -0.061 -0.078 0.206 0.200
[0.263] [0.011]** [0.260] [0.011]**
Month=5 0.097 0.068 0.327 0.354
[0.263] [0.011]** [0.260] [0.011]**
Month=6 0.345 0.327 0.585 0.629
[0.261] [0.011]** [0.259]* [0.011]**
Month=7 0.495 0.501 0.713 0.780
[0.262] [0.011]** [0.261]** [0.011]**
Month=8 0.753 0.753 0.939 0.995
[0.261]** [0.011]** [0.261]** [0.011]**
Month=9 1.125 1.140 1.306 1.362
[0.260]** [0.011]** [0.261]** [0.011]**
Month=10 1.682 1.655 1.843 1.877
[0.259]** [0.011]** [0.261]** [0.011]**
Month=11 1.803 1.729 1.957 1.920
[0.261]** [0.011]** [0.264]** [0.011]**
Month=12 1.939 1.926 2.174 2.213
[0.263]** [0.011]** [0.267]** [0.011]**
Year=2003 3.046 2.978 3.603 3.567
[0.201]** [0.008]** [0.201]** [0.008]**
Year=2004 4.421 4.333 5.231 5.217
[0.236]** [0.010]** [0.238]** [0.010]**
Unemployment rate Month-Region -5.024 -10.382 3.567 -1.228
[6.676] [0.278]** [6.812] [0.284]**
Observations 16923 10800000 16923 10800000
Standard errors in brackets
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Table 4 
(1) (2) (4) (3)
Weighted Not Weighted Weighted Not Weighted




Number of children 19.645 26.734 20.546 26.625
[11,479.419] [16,658.942] [18,217.771] [15,976.126]
Company size 22.515 29.586 23.525 29.580
[485.162] [708.586] [753.089] [664.206]
Secondary Industry 1.509 1.655 1.710 1.922
[0.403]** [0.017]** [0.420]** [0.018]**
Tertiary Industry -0.712 -1.029 -0.563 -0.828
[0.360]* [0.016]** [0.362] [0.016]**
Length of time in job -0.219 -0.217 -0.221 -0.221
[0.021]** [0.001]** [0.021]** [0.001]**
Month=2 -0.031 -0.057 -0.009 -0.029
[0.234] [0.010]** [0.236] [0.010]**
Month=3 0.019 0.022 0.041 0.053
[0.236] [0.010]* [0.237] [0.010]**
Month=4 0.537 0.580 0.560 0.614
[0.234]* [0.010]** [0.235]* [0.010]**
Month=5 0.559 0.610 0.595 0.658
[0.233]* [0.010]** [0.234]* [0.010]**
Month=6 0.535 0.562 0.583 0.630
[0.235]* [0.010]** [0.235]* [0.010]**
Month=7 0.712 0.735 0.753 0.797
[0.237]** [0.010]** [0.238]** [0.010]**
Month=8 0.861 0.844 0.902 0.908
[0.235]** [0.010]** [0.236]** [0.010]**
Month=9 0.937 0.907 0.972 0.964
[0.237]** [0.010]** [0.238]** [0.010]**
Month=10 1.139 1.136 1.140 1.155
[0.237]** [0.010]** [0.238]** [0.010]**
Month=11 1.031 1.034 1.058 1.083
[0.236]** [0.010]** [0.236]** [0.010]**
Month=12 0.944 0.986 0.987 1.054
[0.240]** [0.010]** [0.239]** [0.010]**
Year=2003 1.658 1.675 1.806 1.891
[0.178]** [0.007]** [0.142]** [0.006]**
Year=2004 2.064 2.082 2.229 2.344
[0.206]** [0.009]** [0.158]** [0.007]**
Unemployment rate Month-Region 39.785 36.711 39.440 35.702
[3.924]** [0.167]** [3.901]** [0.166]**
Observations 24960 14300000 24960 14300000
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Fixed-effects logit model
Temporal Jobs, Coefficients
   30 
Table 5   31 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unemployed Inactive Unemployed Inactive
UI members x Oct2002 -0.012 -0.003
[0.001]** [0.001]**
Beneficiary x Oct2002 0.003 -0.002
[0.004] [0.001]**




Oct2002 onwards 0.010 0.003 0.007 0.001
[0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.000]**
Woman 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.001
[0.001] [0.000]** [0.001] [0.000]**
Single -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.000
[0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000]
Education -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Age -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000]** [0.000] [0.000]**
Number of children -0.002 -0.000 -0.002 -0.000
[0.001]** [0.000] [0.001]** [0.000]
Company size 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Secondary Industry 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.001
[0.001]* [0.001] [0.002] [0.001]
Tertiary Industry 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000
[0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001]
Length of time in job -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000
[0.000]** [0.000]** [0.000]** [0.000]**
Unemployment month-region -0.030 -0.011 -0.038 -0.010
[0.011]** [0.008] [0.013]** [0.006]
Month=2 0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001
[0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001]
Month=3 -0.003 0.001 -0.004 0.001
[0.002] [0.001] [0.002]* [0.001]
Month=4 -0.002 -0.001 -0.004 -0.001
[0.002] [0.001] [0.002]* [0.001]
Month=5 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001
[0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001]
Month=6 0.003 -0.001 0.003 -0.001
[0.002]* [0.001] [0.002] [0.001]
Month=7 0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.000
[0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001]
Month=8 0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.000
[0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001]
Month=9 0.003 -0.001 0.002 -0.001
[0.001]* [0.001] [0.002] [0.001]
Month=10 -0.003 0.000 -0.002 0.000
[0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001]
Month=11 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.000
[0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001]
Month=12 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.003
[0.001]* [0.001]** [0.002]** [0.001]**
Constant -0.022 -0.016 -0.020 -0.012
[0.003]** [0.003]** [0.004]** [0.002]**
Observations 44538 44538 44538 44538
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Multinomial Logit
Permanent Job
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Table 6   33 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unemployed Inactive Unemployed Inactive
UI members x Oct2002 0.009 -0.001
[0.002]** [0.000]
Beneficiary x Oct2002 0.008 -0.046
[0.005] [0.010]**
UI members 0.010 0.002 0.003 0.001
[0.002]** [0.001]** [0.001]* [0.000]*
Beneficiary -0.014 -0.002
[0.002]** [0.001]**
Oct2002 onwards 0.005 -0.001
[0.006] [0.000]*
Woman 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001
[0.001]* [0.001]** [0.001] [0.000]**
Single 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001
[0.001] [0.000]** [0.001] [0.000]**
Education -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000]* [0.000] [0.000]*
Age -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Number of children -0.002 0.000 -0.002 0.000
[0.001]* [0.000] [0.001] [0.000]
Company size 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.000
[0.000]* [0.000] [0.000]* [0.000]
Secondary Industry -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001
[0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000]*
Tertiary Industry -0.004 -0.000 -0.005 -0.000
[0.001]** [0.000] [0.002]** [0.000]
Length of time in job -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.000
[0.000]** [0.000]** [0.000]** [0.000]**
Unemployment month-region -0.067 -0.004 -0.068 -0.001
[0.016]** [0.004] [0.017]** [0.003]
Month=2 0.009 0.003 0.010 0.002
[0.003]** [0.001]** [0.003]** [0.000]**
Month=3 0.028 0.003 0.030 0.002
[0.003]** [0.001]** [0.003]** [0.001]**
Month=4 0.032 0.002 0.033 0.001
[0.003]** [0.001]** [0.003]** [0.000]**
Month=5 0.031 0.002 0.032 0.001
[0.003]** [0.001]* [0.003]** [0.000]
Month=6 0.022 0.001 0.022 0.001
[0.003]** [0.001] [0.003]** [0.000]
Month=7 0.020 -0.003 0.020 -0.002
[0.003]** [0.001]* [0.004]** [0.001]*
Month=8 0.022 0.001 0.022 0.001
[0.003]** [0.001] [0.004]** [0.000]
Month=9 0.019 -0.000 0.019 -0.000
[0.003]** [0.001] [0.003]** [0.001]
Month=10 0.014 -0.001 0.018 -0.001
[0.003]** [0.001] [0.004]** [0.001]
Month=11 0.014 -0.001 0.016 -0.000
[0.003]** [0.001] [0.003]** [0.000]
Month=12 0.028 0.003 0.031 0.002
[0.003]** [0.001]** [0.004]** [0.001]**
Constant -0.041 -0.009 -0.040 -0.006
[0.005]** [0.002]** [0.005]** [0.002]**
Observations 29279 29279 29279 29279
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Multinomial Logit
Temporary Job
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Table 7   35 
(1) (2)
Unemployed Unemployed
UI members x Oct2002 -0.062
[0.011]**
Beneficiary x Oct2002 -0.024
[0.054]














Number of children 0.000 -0.003
[0.007] [0.008]
Company size -0.032 -0.017
[0.016]* [0.019]
Secondary Industry -0.032 -0.017
[0.016]* [0.019]
Tertiary Industry -0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000]
Length of time in job 0.176 0.210
[0.131] [0.143]

























Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Permanent Job
Multinomial Logit
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Table 8   37 
(1) (2)
Unemployed Unemployed
UI members x Oct2002 -0.072
[0.009]**
















Number of children 0.008 0.008
[0.006] [0.006]
Company size 0.023 0.026
[0.007]** [0.007]**
Secondary Industry 0.033 0.053
[0.007]** [0.007]**
Tertiary Industry 0.002 0.003
[0.001]** [0.001]**
Length of time in job 0.013 0.098
[0.092] [0.096]

























Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Multinomial Logit
Temporary Job
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Figure 5: Duration analysis 
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Figure 6: Duration analysis 
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Table 9: Duration analysis 
Semiparametric Estimates (Cox Ratios) 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿! ￿ ￿"#￿ ￿ ￿￿"#￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ "#￿ ￿￿
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Figure 8: Duration analysis 












Figure 9: Duration analysis 












Figure 10: Duration analysis 
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Table 10: Duration analysis 
Semiparametric Estimates 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
$ ￿% ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
$ ￿% ￿￿￿￿&￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
% ￿’￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
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Table 11 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Permanent Jobs Permanent Jobs Temporal Jobs Temporal Jobs




Number of children 0.003 0.003 -0.016 -0.015
[0.010] [0.010] [0.012] [0.012]
Company size 0.003 0.004 0.008 0.007
[0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]**
Secondary Industry -0.068 -0.065 0.125 0.128
[0.022]** [0.022]** [0.014]** [0.014]**
Tertiary Industry -0.056 -0.054 -0.063 -0.060
[0.021]** [0.021]* [0.016]** [0.016]**
Length of time in job 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001
[0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001] [0.001]
Month=2 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
[0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004]
Month=3 -0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.000
[0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004]
Month=4 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000
[0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004]
Month=5 0.001 0.002 -0.004 -0.002
[0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004]
Month=6 0.003 0.004 -0.002 -0.000
[0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004]
Month=7 0.004 0.005 -0.002 0.000
[0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004]
Month=8 0.005 0.005 -0.004 -0.003
[0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004]
Month=9 0.005 0.006 -0.003 -0.001
[0.003] [0.003]* [0.004] [0.004]
Month=10 0.007 0.007 -0.001 0.001
[0.003]* [0.003]* [0.004] [0.004]
Month=11 0.008 0.009 -0.001 0.001
[0.003]** [0.003]** [0.004] [0.004]
Month=12 0.008 0.009 -0.001 0.003
[0.003]** [0.003]** [0.005] [0.004]
Year=2003 0.003 0.006 -0.008 0.002
[0.001]* [0.001]** [0.002]** [0.002]
Year=2004 0.013 0.018 0.012 0.025
[0.002]** [0.002]** [0.003]** [0.003]**
Unemployment rate Month-Region 0.934 0.962 -0.552 -0.598
[0.164]** [0.163]** [0.104]** [0.104]**
Costant 11.867 11.867 11.646 11.652
[0.025]** [0.025]** [0.015]** [0.015]**
Observations 53627 53627 45341 45341
Folio Number 2100 2100 2039 2039
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03
Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Panel Data model
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Table E1 
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Table E3 
Year Month Men Women Total
January 0,70% 0,83% 0,76%
February 1,63% 1,51% 1,58%
March 3,26% 3,12% 3,20%
April 3,65% 2,92% 3,35%
May 3,11% 2,49% 2,85%
June 2,40% 2,07% 2,26%
July 2,00% 1,58% 1,83%
August 2,51% 1,87% 2,25%
September 2,38% 1,86% 2,17%
October 2,43% 1,69% 2,13%
November 1,99% 1,94% 1,97%
December 3,41% 5,14% 4,14%
January 2,28% 1,85% 2,11%
February 2,24% 2,75% 2,45%
March 3,69% 3,35% 3,55%
April 3,12% 4,17% 3,55%
May 2,91% 2,09% 2,58%
June 2,21% 3,18% 2,61%
July 2,00% 2,15% 2,06%
August 1,81% 1,48% 1,67%
September 2,73% 1,66% 2,29%
October 1,86% 2,02% 1,93%
November 2,66% 2,74% 2,69%
December 3,41% 7,23% 5,01%
January 1,96% 2,32% 2,11%
February 2,30% 2,66% 2,45%
March 4,00% 4,52% 4,22%
April 3,97% 3,63% 3,83%
May 3,51% 3,95% 3,69%
June 2,77% 3,13% 2,92%
July 3,27% 1,38% 2,50%
August 2,77% 2,97% 2,85%
September 2,67% 2,94% 2,78%
October 2,91% 3,02% 2,96%
November 4,05% 3,76% 3,92%
December
2004
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Table E4 
Year Month None PrimaryInc PrimaryCom SecondInc SecondCom TechnHigher UnivInc UnivCom
January 0,00% 0,90% 0,00% 1,00% 0,45% 1,56% 2,31% 0,00%
February 5,01% 2,28% 0,22% 1,36% 1,85% 1,73% 1,92% 0,00%
March 10,56% 5,36% 5,50% 2,61% 2,26% 1,05% 0,59% 2,26%
April 3,14% 6,80% 5,80% 2,19% 2,31% 1,75% 0,55% 1,10%
May 3,31% 3,96% 4,15% 2,58% 2,18% 2,32% 4,42% 0,00%
June 7,73% 2,53% 2,39% 1,97% 2,17% 1,64% 4,09% 0,00%
July 0,00% 1,55% 1,45% 3,60% 1,53% 1,35% 1,82% 0,00%
August 0,00% 2,05% 2,18% 3,47% 1,68% 2,10% 2,15% 3,83%
September 0,00% 1,90% 4,94% 2,34% 2,24% 0,00% 0,59% 1,67%
October 0,00% 2,56% 1,74% 1,07% 2,74% 1,31% 3,78% 1,62%
November 4,34% 2,47% 2,82% 2,15% 1,68% 1,16% 0,73% 1,79%
December 2,88% 3,47% 6,16% 5,26% 3,85% 2,86% 3,80% 2,34%
January 5,65% 1,31% 2,51% 2,01% 2,11% 2,12% 2,52% 3,06%
February 11,60% 2,98% 2,56% 2,42% 1,93% 0,87% 3,32% 4,07%
March 15,14% 4,94% 5,73% 3,15% 3,07% 2,58% 1,25% 0,00%
April 9,67% 6,84% 5,17% 3,16% 2,34% 2,70% 0,00% 2,75%
May 0,00% 5,13% 2,97% 1,49% 2,82% 1,48% 0,67% 0,72%
June 8,44% 2,55% 3,21% 2,02% 3,16% 0,66% 2,90% 2,81%
July 0,00% 1,18% 1,51% 2,98% 2,71% 1,29% 0,64% 1,92%
August 0,00% 1,26% 2,03% 0,94% 2,28% 1,04% 1,92% 2,34%
September 0,00% 3,22% 2,08% 2,53% 2,20% 1,12% 3,24% 0,67%
October 4,41% 1,83% 2,28% 2,17% 2,12% 1,81% 0,76% 0,76%
November 0,00% 3,71% 3,11% 2,08% 3,29% 1,14% 0,00% 2,81%
December 9,10% 6,21% 5,91% 3,69% 4,95% 3,53% 3,89% 7,85%
January 0,00% 2,18% 2,35% 1,70% 2,15% 1,58% 5,29% 0,00%
February 0,00% 2,99% 2,28% 2,48% 2,35% 0,41% 5,93% 2,54%
March 4,47% 8,11% 6,64% 2,60% 4,34% 1,61% 0,66% 0,00%
April 6,52% 8,68% 3,75% 3,95% 2,70% 3,35% 0,00% 0,52%
May 0,00% 7,19% 3,73% 3,71% 3,24% 3,05% 1,02% 1,49%
June 0,00% 3,54% 3,59% 2,51% 4,02% 1,52% 0,00% 0,89%
July 0,00% 2,53% 3,54% 2,23% 2,62% 1,71% 1,52% 2,93%
August 10,81% 4,40% 4,41% 2,94% 2,04% 1,23% 2,98% 1,37%
September 4,78% 4,39% 0,95% 4,32% 2,72% 1,48% 2,35% 0,86%
October 4,03% 4,23% 5,88% 3,17% 1,73% 2,29% 0,00% 3,25%
November 0,00% 2,82% 3,21% 4,49% 5,02% 1,55% 2,38% 7,34%
December
Total 3,71% 3,51% 3,26% 2,55% 2,51% 1,64% 2,02% 1,83%
2004
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Table E5 
Year Month permanent temporary self-employed Total
January 0,42% 1,53% 1,47% 0,76%
February 0,64% 3,76% 1,03% 1,58%
March 0,30% 9,35% 1,66% 3,20%
April 0,53% 10,67% 2,76% 3,35%
May 0,76% 8,83% 2,46% 2,85%
June 1,55% 3,85% 1,39% 2,26%
July 0,75% 5,29% 0,42% 1,83%
August 1,40% 4,50% 1,39% 2,25%
September 1,41% 4,05% 0,23% 2,17%
October 0,93% 4,26% 0,39% 2,13%
November 1,00% 3,61% 0,80% 1,97%
December 2,04% 7,65% 2,80% 4,14%
January 1,69% 2,82% 0,35% 2,11%
February 1,88% 4,16% 0,31% 2,45%
March 1,11% 8,24% 4,16% 3,55%
April 1,14% 9,48% 1,92% 3,55%
May 0,95% 7,93% 2,08% 2,58%
June 1,80% 5,17% 0,68% 2,61%
July 1,19% 3,99% 0,56% 2,06%
August 0,72% 3,58% 0,55% 1,67%
September 1,44% 3,70% 1,64% 2,29%
October 1,35% 2,92% 0,38% 1,93%
November 2,18% 4,06% 0,76% 2,69%
December 3,36% 8,17% 1,95% 5,01%
January 1,91% 2,90% 1,49% 2,11%
February 1,54% 4,39% 0,93% 2,45%
March 0,98% 9,41% 2,32% 4,22%
April 0,94% 10,03% 2,17% 3,83%
May 1,80% 9,11% 2,71% 3,69%
June 2,32% 5,24% 0,00% 2,92%
July 2,10% 3,74% 0,56% 2,50%
August 1,78% 5,53% 0,66% 2,85%
September 2,57% 3,45% 0,00% 2,78%
October 1,91% 5,23% 0,00% 2,96%
November 2,83% 4,93% 1,88% 3,92%
December
2004
Percentage of workers leaving jobs
by type of job
2002
2003
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Table E6 
Year Month Non-contributor contributor Total
January 1,06% 0,65% 0,76%
February 1,85% 1,48% 1,58%
March 3,48% 3,10% 3,20%
April 4,10% 3,07% 3,35%
May 3,85% 2,48% 2,85%
June 1,86% 2,41% 2,26%
July 1,79% 1,84% 1,83%
August 1,07% 2,69% 2,25%
September 1,59% 2,40% 2,17%
October 1,80% 2,26% 2,13%
November 1,49% 2,17% 1,97%
December 5,18% 3,69% 4,14%
January 1,51% 2,36% 2,11%
February 2,29% 2,52% 2,45%
March 4,45% 3,15% 3,55%
April 3,88% 3,41% 3,55%
May 2,75% 2,50% 2,58%
June 1,38% 3,14% 2,61%
July 1,26% 2,43% 2,06%
August 1,29% 1,86% 1,67%
September 1,89% 2,48% 2,29%
October 1,88% 1,95% 1,93%
November 1,65% 3,19% 2,69%
December 4,34% 5,35% 5,01%
January 2,35% 1,98% 2,11%
February 1,77% 2,80% 2,45%
March 4,58% 4,02% 4,22%
April 3,82% 3,83% 3,83%
May 3,35% 3,87% 3,69%
June 1,02% 3,98% 2,92%
July 2,45% 2,54% 2,50%
August 2,10% 3,28% 2,85%
September 2,81% 2,76% 2,78%
October 1,68% 3,75% 2,96%
November 3,56% 4,15% 3,92%
December
2004
Percentage of workers leaving jobs
by pension system participation
2002
2003
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Table E7 
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Table E8 
Year Month Men Women Total
January 1,15% 0,85% 1,01%
February 3,76% 3,12% 3,44%
March 6,81% 8,18% 7,48%
April 5,61% 5,02% 5,33%
May 4,65% 3,35% 4,05%
June 6,77% 2,81% 4,95%
July 6,17% 4,10% 5,21%
August 7,32% 2,76% 5,20%
September 9,48% 6,27% 7,97%
October 7,75% 7,67% 7,71%
November 7,84% 6,01% 6,99%
December 13,88% 8,86% 11,55%
January 7,29% 4,78% 6,06%
February 6,35% 6,20% 6,28%
March 7,96% 8,66% 8,30%
April 4,93% 2,38% 3,70%
May 4,59% 4,41% 4,50%
June 5,86% 4,30% 5,12%
July 3,84% 2,76% 3,32%
August 5,17% 2,44% 3,83%
September 7,99% 5,57% 6,80%
October 9,86% 9,93% 9,89%
November 10,48% 6,78% 8,66%
December 14,65% 12,63% 13,65%
January 8,39% 6,52% 7,42%
February 4,38% 8,09% 6,31%
March 7,53% 8,42% 7,98%
April 5,38% 4,21% 4,79%
May 6,83% 3,55% 5,21%
June 6,34% 3,60% 4,98%
July 6,12% 3,51% 4,82%
August 7,98% 7,25% 7,63%
September 10,40% 7,10% 8,79%
October 13,48% 7,58% 10,51%
November 11,82% 11,05% 11,42%
December
2004
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Table E9 
Year Month None PrimaryInc PrimaryCom SecondInc SecondCom TechnHigher UnivInc UnivCom
January 6,51% 0,00% 2,73% 1,44% 0,34% 0,00% 3,33% 0,00%
February 0,00% 6,08% 1,22% 2,25% 4,15% 3,25% 2,73% 0,00%
March 6,55% 5,69% 12,62% 9,84% 7,51% 0,00% 2,05% 13,60%
April 0,00% 6,30% 4,71% 9,76% 3,97% 4,71% 2,25% 3,16%
May 0,00% 3,29% 3,21% 8,65% 3,62% 1,24% 5,24% 4,50%
June 5,14% 6,46% 6,86% 1,65% 4,85% 5,41% 1,61% 4,42%
July 21,05% 4,84% 3,92% 2,40% 4,63% 4,30% 14,04% 9,80%
August 0,00% 4,62% 7,33% 7,72% 4,73% 1,39% 0,00% 14,24%
September 0,00% 6,03% 13,90% 10,85% 6,29% 1,22% 12,91% 10,72%
October 0,00% 9,11% 7,70% 11,84% 5,03% 9,78% 5,19% 4,09%
November 6,01% 9,24% 5,72% 6,78% 5,82% 10,37% 3,46% 0,00%
December 11,22% 12,13% 16,05% 10,09% 9,85% 8,90% 11,70% 18,64%
January 9,94% 4,56% 6,30% 6,03% 7,10% 10,91% 0,00% 0,00%
February 0,00% 5,97% 5,56% 8,67% 6,47% 0,00% 11,59% 7,27%
March 0,00% 4,50% 6,07% 12,13% 9,13% 11,73% 3,85% 19,78%
April 9,18% 3,53% 4,80% 4,62% 3,25% 2,71% 0,00% 4,55%
May 0,00% 5,14% 3,17% 7,54% 4,33% 1,27% 6,03% 0,00%
June 0,00% 7,37% 3,94% 3,45% 4,98% 4,33% 10,41% 0,00%
July 4,24% 2,69% 0,63% 6,91% 3,91% 2,46% 2,00% 3,26%
August 7,42% 3,59% 4,23% 5,27% 4,06% 1,15% 0,00% 4,69%
September 0,00% 6,27% 9,62% 9,07% 5,83% 4,42% 4,78% 9,41%
October 5,07% 11,16% 6,46% 9,04% 13,47% 3,24% 2,47% 14,66%
November 9,04% 10,87% 9,61% 6,78% 9,19% 7,52% 0,00% 10,48%
December 4,36% 13,24% 15,97% 16,35% 13,83% 13,66% 8,53% 8,26%
January 7,37% 2,69% 11,04% 12,52% 7,53% 8,66% 3,89% 4,90%
February 5,31% 5,40% 1,92% 10,11% 6,93% 5,18% 13,20% 0,00%
March 16,61% 3,30% 13,14% 12,18% 7,30% 12,64% 0,00% 5,94%
April 0,00% 2,47% 6,60% 6,56% 4,23% 3,75% 15,19% 0,00%
May 0,00% 8,18% 4,05% 1,61% 4,89% 7,46% 0,00% 8,78%
June 0,00% 4,87% 5,64% 9,51% 4,00% 2,86% 6,92% 0,00%
July 0,00% 3,79% 6,53% 8,22% 4,45% 7,91% 0,00% 0,00%
August 14,32% 3,61% 5,36% 12,02% 8,75% 4,92% 2,38% 26,58%
September 5,28% 7,15% 11,25% 10,82% 10,05% 4,94% 2,65% 10,32%
October 28,44% 13,69% 10,12% 12,42% 9,14% 6,99% 0,00% 4,68%
November 8,12% 13,40% 6,70% 14,58% 12,23% 9,44% 2,63% 16,99%
December
2004














































Average salary of those moving from 
employment to unemployment
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Table E11 
Year Month Men Women Total
January 140.942 178.248 157.683
February 215.030 111.756 174.634
March 138.462 120.504 131.313
April 139.135 122.666 133.247
May 159.757 127.666 148.278
June 188.528 97.919 154.393
July 174.404 148.441 165.146
August 212.225 140.355 187.491
September 193.008 162.232 182.130
October 163.902 131.773 153.356
November 212.236 96.969 164.742
December 178.069 120.722 148.187
January 172.858 142.765 162.013
February 130.614 136.660 133.417
March 132.038 127.446 130.251
April 132.024 154.932 143.113
May 176.620 121.145 158.282
June 185.651 219.473 202.558
July 187.422 119.807 158.798
August 181.458 121.422 159.786
September 192.935 119.637 171.328
October 167.212 109.761 142.376
November 181.323 300.799 232.393
December 176.458 136.362 152.155
January 180.612 185.806 182.935
February 178.044 151.051 166.060
March 135.112 124.648 130.495
April 165.547 123.870 149.449
May 199.023 131.557 169.374
June 182.159 112.004 151.231
July 186.249 131.139 173.875
August 172.063 119.255 149.163
September 170.946 132.627 153.776
October 201.166 101.152 156.946
November 224.671 128.570 184.844
December          
2004
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Table E12 
Year Month None PrimaryInc PrimaryCom SecondInc SecondCom TechnHigher UnivInc UnivCom
January           173.016           113.815 124.388 247.387 118.402          
February 86.313 92.501 145.000 147.666 247.342 208.826 180.000          
March 102.499 120.759 105.830 162.857 146.694 123.541 130.000 216.755
April 70.000 128.222 131.734 117.275 148.467 163.474 115.000 128.000
May 120.000 122.329 122.004 110.734 160.735 319.890 153.593          
June 35.541 119.791 138.298 110.751 114.850 284.030 386.265          
July           157.139 143.866 155.561 176.076 224.998 167.479          
August           115.098 90.521 161.464 146.389 319.954 297.483 467.700
September           126.562 157.344 136.470 211.683           600.000 401.794
October           116.077 176.631 119.830 167.017 130.939 154.649 260.483
November 10.000 135.589 133.144 202.955 136.291 160.340 200.000 500.000
December 80.000 111.223 138.465 152.941 123.972 136.635 336.537 346.241
January 350.000 111.263 135.555 141.263 156.293 256.814 158.497 156.320
February 141.751 83.726 103.174 158.569 137.616 232.444 100.000 230.000
March 97.319 112.559 122.054 134.809 141.645 152.412 223.072          
April 82.726 104.928 124.968 119.044 162.468 182.927           469.293
May           95.896 122.841 120.073 157.407 138.458 200.000 2.200.000
June 107.500 161.531 117.011 163.311 170.842 58.279 118.069 1.058.252
July           118.751 96.964 105.826 172.741 119.321 111.000 599.107
August           95.013 117.227 101.781 168.674 110.559 233.992 356.452
September           112.241 128.611 184.727 143.138 203.647 303.665 200.000
October 100.000 98.552 123.698 124.637 165.014 104.174 200.000 550.000
November           128.241 141.642 138.071 352.352 191.292           334.550
December 105.618 117.541 126.456 149.102 138.104 215.368 298.267 216.253
January           126.735 122.394 170.461 171.068 468.125 188.820          
February           130.363 167.265 170.827 159.903 220.000 232.885 120.000
March 90.000 113.868 151.153 153.648 125.406 146.306 130.000          
April 100.000 122.848 115.570 130.557 137.353 363.893           130.000
May           113.089 125.217 137.372 180.763 215.517 508.000 900.000
June           111.708 91.845 230.111 159.893 123.351           300.000
July           161.939 160.976 193.344 142.665 163.490 501.587 200.000
August 127.426 119.014 140.963 119.795 151.610 72.926 121.020 1.000.000
September 120.000 125.692 55.883 137.200 122.316 382.404 330.784 355.000
October 45.000 142.988 133.610 149.735 188.930 200.234           190.303
November           126.779 145.953 165.726 126.424 187.161 650.000 425.841
December                                                                                
2004













May 248.474          
June 179.190 12.000
July 273.114          
August 283.106 140.000


















March 122.256          
April 277.222 112.704
May 359.109 250.000
June 185.151          





December                    
2004
Average salary of those moving from employment to unemployment
by reason for leaving job
2002
2003
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Table E14 
Year Month permanent temporary self-employed
January 211.864 130.633 169.886
February 328.419 127.792 169.554
March 150.695 123.671 63.064
April 151.282 127.594 64.497
May 268.722 119.665 228.648
June 190.434 113.424 98.390
July 235.521 142.673 300.000
August 264.957 131.954 140.373
September 221.013 159.054 80.000
October 190.774 141.917 90.000
November 222.943 140.817 70.000
December 137.426 146.869 137.854
January 198.462 107.703 100.000
February 144.725 119.793 350.000
March 138.473 123.647 125.010
April 255.195 111.034 76.648
May 288.372 115.414 93.097
June 250.769 151.897 150.000
July 195.448 116.032 61.119
August 206.576 141.654 63.443
September 197.363 123.918 142.250
October 170.689 98.583 70.000
November 301.316 130.555 90.959
December 172.734 132.018 102.959
January 242.405 118.148 83.662
February 203.312 139.363 225.216
March 154.969 122.825 71.496
April 243.267 129.510 132.268
May 214.058 120.557 162.252
June 142.481 147.924          
July 170.558 168.267 250.000
August 196.412 116.842 142.120
September 186.250 104.510          
October 162.977 125.899          
November 216.469 120.248 92.900
December          
2004
Average salary of those moving from employment to unemployment
by type of job
2002
2003
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Table E15 
gender p25 median p75
Men 2 5 12
Women 3 7 14





type of education p25 median p75
None 2 7 16
PrimaryInc 3 7 13
PrimaryCom 3 6 12
SecondaryInc 2 5 12
SecondaryCom 3 5 12
TechnHigher 3 6 12
UnivInc 3 7 17
UnivCom 3 7 12





Activity p25 median p75
Undefined sector 4 12 24
Agriculture 3 5 8
Mining 2 3 5
Industry 3 5 10
Electricity 3 3 13
Construction 2 4 7
Retail 2 5 11
Transport 2 6 12
Financial services 2 6 12
Trade services 2 5 12
Not well specified 3 4 6
Duration of unemployment (months)
by economic sector
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Table E18 
Age p25 median p75
16 to 21 2 4 9
22 to 31 3 5 12
32 to 41 3 5 12
42 to 51 3 6 13
52 to 64 3 7 17
over 56 6 12 21





Permanent p25 median p75
No 3 6 13
Yes 2 5 12
Duration of unemployment (months)




contract p25 median p75
No 3 8 16
Yes 2 5 9
Duration of unemployment (months)




cause p25 median p75
No 3 6 12
Yes 3 7 14
Duration of unemployment (months)




cause p25 median p75
No 3 6 12
Yes 4 11 21
Duration of unemployment (months)
for those who had children in the 2002-2004 period









less than or equal to $100,000 35.142 70.000 50%
$100,000 to $150,000 40.787 120.000 30%
$150,000 to $350,000 57.628 200.000 30%
greater than or equal to $350,000 56.855 600.000 9%
Salary versus Unemployment Insurance Amount
 